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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #03561-84/1  
22 June 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓ Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [REDACTED]

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A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 19 June 1984. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [REDACTED]

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## WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

OVERVIEW

Prior to substantive discussions on specific countries selected as agenda items for this meeting, NIO/AF noted the following areas of current concern in Africa:

- Ethiopian threats to US facilities in the Horn area.
- Sudan, particularly the renewal of hostilities in the south.
- Nigeria and the increase in coup rumors.
- Mozambique and the acceleration of RENAMO activities.
- Southern Africa, with the focus on whether Angola will agree to a Cuban troop withdrawal.
- The OAU, whether, when and where this year's summit meeting will be held.
- The Ogaden skirmishes.
- Uganda: dissident insurrection, military indiscipline and political instability.
- Zaire and recently reported threats of sabotage from the FLNC.
- Zimbabwe: dissident activities in Matabeleland and government suppression of ZAPU.
- Upper Volta: increasing radicalization.

MOZAMBIQUE

Assuming South Africa continues to withhold its support from the RENAMO resistance movement, the RENAMO insurgency will nevertheless remain a serious military threat over the next six months, following which the movement will likely devolve to disorganized banditry. The present aim of the dissidents is to force President Machel to share power with them, something Machel is not likely to do as long as he believes

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that the movement will dissipate over the long term. Recent RENAMO attacks on power lines, transportation links and civilian targets will discourage economic development and investment and will raise anew the question of whether South Africa actually has cut off its support to the insurgents. Community analysts believe South Africa has ceased its support but question whether the South African government can or will use its influence to persuade RENAMO to accept an offer of amnesty from FRELIMO. Recent cabinet changes within the Mozambican government are but the tip of the iceberg and reflect rather sweeping political changes mandated by Machel. Beyond some genuine criticism of the security services for abuse of power, most of the changes are believed to be part of Machel's standard operating procedure of keeping his potential political opponents off balance.

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Forecast: Over the next six months, RENAMO will still be an effective fighting force but South Africa will be trying to persuade the insurgents to subordinate their military offensive to a political campaign designed to secure for them a legitimate voice in the Mozambican government. The Nkomati agreement with South Africa will hold despite the RENAMO activities, primarily because of Machel's lack of alternatives and the potential economic benefits to Mozambique.

#### UGANDA

This is one of the real political basket cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economically, the country has not done badly, but politically it is a shambles. [REDACTED]

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UNCODED [REDACTED] The military is tragically undisciplined but its effectiveness is favorably and mercifully measured against the ineffective but persistent insurgency. Tanzania is not likely to resume active responsibility for restoring order in Uganda, primarily because of Tanzania's own economic problems. Despite Obote's political weakness, there is no practical alternative to him. He appears to offend people the least.

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Forecast: Obote will most likely stay in power over the next six months. The Ugandan Army is unlikely to change its effectiveness, character or demeanor in the near term and the insurgency is likely to sputter along with periodic raids on Kampala and greater attention being paid to developing grass roots support among the civilian population. Tanzania is not likely to play any greater or more decisive role over the next six months.

FREE FORUM

Ethiopia. Inconclusive yet alarming reports [redacted] indicate that the Ethiopian government may plan to attack US facilities and personnel in the Horn area in retaliation for what Ethiopia believes to be US responsibility for the Eritrean attack on the Asmara airfield. Given Mengistu's open hostility towards the US and the Ethiopian security service's established willingness and capability of conducting cross-border operations, the reports must be taken seriously. State is following up with the third country officials involved to obtain additional details.

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Nigeria. Coup rumors are increasing. Historians note that July has been a popular month for coup attempts. It was also noted that even though the civilian Nigerian Security Organization may be aware of some coup plotting, it is generally hampered in gaining access to military facilities and may not be able to adequately monitor dissident elements. It was not successful in detecting or warding off the last coup.

Sudan. Nimeiri may be willing to accept the loss of smaller towns to the southern insurgents but the loss of a provincial capital such as Malakal would be politically disastrous. If the resumed southern hostilities culminate in such a development, Nimeiri is likely to press his allies hard--particularly Egypt and the US--for security assistance. He may also increase his support to the Eritrean rebels in retaliation for Ethiopia's support to the Sudanese insurgents.

Kenya. Despite some good news on Kenya's economy and Moi's emergence as a dynamic leader, Community analysts are still bothered by the long-term threat posed by the increasingly disenfranchised Kikuyus.

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